ilian's chief support, the French Emperor, dreading
the formidable hostility of the United States of America, which could not
tolerate an empire on the borders of their great republic, was obliged to
withdraw from Mexico the army which, from the first, was necessary to
sustain the new empire. Napoleon, one would say, was pledged to
Maximilian, having induced him to assume the Imperial Crown, and having
also promised all necessary support. He could not, however, command
success; and chivalry, even if it had still existed, would have availed
but little, when power alone could win.
Maximilian was now all alone, face to face with anarchy and the Mexican
nation which he had slighted. Faction ruled in his place. The
revolutionary party which he had favored proved untrue; and falling into
the hands of his enemies, he was solemnly murdered by the ruling brigand
of the day. The officers of Napoleon's army sincerely believed that no
better fate could be anticipated; for they earnestly advised him to
accompany them on their return to Europe. This he could have done without
dishonor. The idea of a Mexican empire was Napoleon's, and he alone was
answerable for its success. On the part of Maximilian it was more than
chivalry to remain in Mexico when his guard was gone. But the idea of the
youthful Prince in regard to honor appears to have been, like his policy,
unsound. The policy may not have been, most probably was not, his. But the
sentiment of honor was all his own. And although, in an age of chivalry
even, it would have appeared exaggerated, it redounds to his credit. It is
not surprising that a man animated by such noble sentiments should have
died as became a hero and a Christian.
(M97) The potentate, on whom, as far as worldly power was concerned,
depended the Pope's temporal sovereignty, was throwing himself every day
more and more into the hands of the enemies of the church. His ministers,
more audacious than himself, carried their blind hatred of "Clericalism"
to such an extent as to sacrifice many of the best supporters of the
empire. This was singularly apparent at the general election of 1863. M.
de Persigny hesitated not to employ all the influence of the government
against such Imperialists as had voted for or shown themselves favorable
to the Pope's temporal power. He succeeded in causing such friends of
Napoleon as De Caverville, Cochin and Lemercier to be replaced by the most
bitter enemies of the Imperial _regim
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