porters of the Imperial system on
account of their dislike to his anti-Roman policy. Not only from such men
did warnings come, but also from eminent statesmen of former _regimes_,
such as Messrs. Sauzet, de Broglie, Vitet, and even M. Guizot, who was a
Protestant, together with Messrs. Thiers, Cousin and Dufaure, who were
only nominal Catholics. "Madame," said M. Thiers, one day, to the Empress,
with more truth than _politesse_, "history lays down the law that
_quiconque mange du Pape en creve_."(6)

So many and such decided manifestations of public opinion were not without
their effects. No less a personage than Garibaldi, relying, as he thought
he could do, on Piedmontese support, now undertook to realize to the full
the revolutionary programme--the Kingdom of Italy, with Rome for its
capital. The King of Piedmont, whilst he publicly disowned the filibuster,
as he had affected to disown him in Sicily, held an army in reserve for
his support. He expected himself to be officially condemned, whilst in
reality, as usual, privately sustained.

(M88) In the meantime, however, the policy of his Imperial patron was
considerably modified; and orders were despatched to his Sardinian
Majesty, which he could neither take as a blind nor dare to disregard. So
the Piedmontese army, which was intended to aid the filibusters in the
sack of Rome, was obliged to fight them. It came up with the bands of
Garibaldi, at a place called Aspromonte, on the 29th of August, 1862. The
irregular force was defeated, its leader wounded in the heel and taken
prisoner. Garibaldi being so renowned a warrior--Achilles was nothing to
him--was immediately released. Napoleon had spoken sincerely at last. If he
had always done so there would have been less disorder, less violation of
all right and less bloodshed, in bringing together the provinces and
states of Italy. If it had been his policy to concur with the Pope and the
party of true reform, instead of patronizing a filibustering prince, he
might have lived to see a less objectionable and more lasting unification
of Italy than that which he so powerfully aided in achieving.

The intriguing Cabinet of Turin took great credit to itself for having so
vigorously acted, although against its will, in preventing Garibaldi from
seizing Rome. As a reward for this signal service, it boldly proposed to
go there itself. But the time had not yet come. The fall of Rome was
destined to occur simultaneously with anot