ctive form in any other passage, we may gather
from the whole tenor of his life that bravery, fortitude, endurance,
occupied a high place in his esteem. While he made no parade of his
sufferings his life was a continual warfare for the Gospel. The courage
of a man is none the less real because it is evinced not on the
battlefield, but in the conflict of righteousness. He who devotes
himself unnoticed and unrewarded, at the risk of his life and at the
sacrifice of every pleasure, to the service of the sick and the debased,
possesses courage the same in principle as that of the 'brave man'
described by Aristotle. Life is a battle, and there are other objects
for which a man must contend than those peculiar to a military calling.
In all circumstances of his existence the Christian must quit himself as
a man, and without courage no one can fulfil in any tolerable degree the
duties of his station.

In like manner temperance or self-control is a truly Christian virtue,
and it finds repeated mention in Scripture. When, however, we compare
the conception of temperance as formulated by Aristotle with the demand
of self-denial which the enlightened Christian conscience makes upon
itself we are struck with a difference both in the motive and the scope
of the principle. Temperance as Aristotle conceived it was a virtue
exhibited only in dealing with the animal passions. And the reason why
this indulgence ought to be checked was that the lusts of the flesh
unfitted a man for his discharge of the civic duties. But, in view of
the Greek idea that evil resides in the physical constitution of man, the
logical deduction would be the total suppression of the animal passions
altogether. But from the Christian standpoint the physical instincts are
not an evil to be crushed, but rather a legitimate element in man which
is to be disciplined and brought into the service of the spiritual life.
Temperance covers the whole range of moral activity. It means the
practical mastery of self, and includes the proper control and employment
of hand and eye, tongue and temper, tastes and affections, so that they
may become effective instruments of righteousness. The practice of {192}
asceticism for its own sake, or abstinence dictated merely by fear of
some painful result of indulgence, we do not now regard as a virtue. The
true form of self-denial we deem to be only rendered when we forbid
ourselves the enjoyment of certain legitimate inclinat