ur? Rather should we ask, Where shall I be safest from
moral danger, and, above all, in what position of life, open to me, can
I do the most good? It is not enough to know that a certain mode of
livelihood is permitted by law; I must decide whether it is permitted
to me as a Christian. For, after all, underlying, and giving purpose
and direction to, our earthly vocation is the deeper calling of God
into His kingdom. These cannot, indeed, be separated. We cannot
divide our life into two sections, a sacred and a secular. Nor must we
restrict the idea of vocation to definite spheres of work. Even those
who are precluded by affliction from the activities of the world are
still God's servants, and may find in suffering itself their divinely
appointed mission. There is a divinity which shapes our ends, and in
every life-calling there is something sacred. 'Saints,' says George
Eliot, 'choose not their tasks, they choose but to do them well.'

But the decisions of life do not cease with the choice of a calling.
At every moment of our career fresh difficulties arise, and new
opportunities open up which demand careful thought. Our first
obligation is to meet faithfully the claims of our station. But in the
complexity of life we are {201} being constantly brought into wider
relations with our fellow-men, which either modify the old, or create
entirely new situations. While the rule is to do the duty that lies
nearest us, to obey the call of God at each moment, it needs no little
wisdom to discern one's immediate duty, and to know what the will of
God actually is.

2. _Conflict of Duties_.--In the sphere of duty itself a three-fold
distinction, having the imprimatur of the Romish Church, has been made
by some moralists: (1) the problem of colliding interests; (2)
'counsels of perfection'; and (3) indifferent acts or 'Adiaphora,'
actions which, being neither commanded nor forbidden, fall outwith the
domain of Christian obligation. It will not be necessary to discuss at
length these questions. The Gospel lends no support to such
distinctions, and as Schleiermacher points out they ought to have no
place in Protestant Ethics.[3]

(1) With regard to the 'conflict of duties,' when the collision is
really, as it often is, a struggle between inclination and duty, the
question answers itself. There are, of course, cases in which
perplexity must occur to an honest man. But the difficulty cannot be
decided by drawing up a