remembered that Christian morality is not of a different sort from
natural morality, and the Christian virtues are not merely supernatural
qualities added on, but simply human virtues coloured and transfigured by
grace and raised to a higher value. The power to act morally, the
capacity to bring all our faculties into the service of the spiritual
life, is the ground of Christian virtue just as it is of every natural
excellence. From this it follows that the distinction sometimes made
between natural goodness and Christian goodness is unsound. A virtue is
not a superlative act of merit, implying an excess of excellence beyond
the requirements of duty. From the Christian standpoint there are no
works of supererogation, and there is no room in the Christian life for
excess or margin. As every duty is a bounden duty, so every possible
excellence is demanded of the Christian. Virtues prescribe duties;
ideals become laws; and the measure is, 'Be ye perfect as your Father in
heaven is perfect.' The Stoic maxim, 'Nothing in excess,' is inadequate
in reference to moral excellence, and Aristotle's doctrine of the 'Mean'
can hardly be applied without considerable distortion of facts. The only
virtue which with truth can be described as a form of moderation is
Temperance. It has been objected that by his doctrine of the 'Mean'
Aristotle 'obliterates the awful and absolute difference between right
and wrong.' If we substitute, as Kant suggested, 'law' for 'mean,' some
of the ambiguity is obviated. Still, after all extenuation is made it
may be questioned whether any term implying quantity is a fit expression
for a moral attribute.[3]

At the same time the virtues must not be regarded as mere abstractions.
Moral qualities cannot be isolated from the circumstances in which they
are exercised. Virtue is character in touch with life, and it is only in
contact with actual events that its quality can be determined. Actions
are not simply good or bad in themselves. They must {186} always be
valued both by their inner motives and intended ends. Courage or
veracity, for example, may be exercised from different causes and for the
most various ends, and occasionally even for those of an immoral
nature.[4]

For these and similar reasons some modern ethical writers have regarded
the classification of the virtues as unsatisfactory, involving arbitrary
and illogical distinctions in value; and some have even discarded the use
of th