2. Ethics again is concerned with a _norm_ of life, and in this sense
it is frequently styled a normative science. That is to say, it is a
science which prescribes rules or maxims according to which life is to
be regulated. This is sometimes expressed by saying that Ethics treats
of what _ought to be_. The ideal must not be one which simply floats
in the air. It must be an ideal which is possible, and, therefore, as
such, obligatory. It is useless to feel the worth of a certain idea,
or even to speak of the desirability of it, if we do not feel also that
it ought to be realised. Moral judgments imply an 'ought,' and that
'ought' implies a norm or standard, in the light of which, as a
criterion, all obligation must be tested, and according to which all
conduct must be regulated.

3. Ethics, once more, is concerned with the _will_. It is based
specifically on the fact that man is not only an intellectual being
(capable of knowing) and a sensitive being (possessed of feeling) but
also a volitional being; that is, a being endowed with self-determining
activity. It implies that man is responsible for his intentions,
dispositions and actions. The idea of a supreme ideal at which he is
to aim and a norm or standard of conduct according to which he ought to
regulate his life, would have no meaning if we did not presuppose the
power of self-determination. {13} Whatever is not willed has no moral
value. Where there is no freedom of choice, we cannot speak of an
action as either good or evil.[1] When we praise or blame a man's
conduct we do so under the assumption that his action is voluntary. In
all moral action purpose is implied. This is the meaning of the
well-known dictum of Kant, 'There is nothing in the world . . . that
can be called good without qualification except a good will. A good
will is good, not because of what it performs or effects, not by its
aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue
of the volition.'[2] It is the inner aim, the good will which alone
gives moral worth to any endeavour. It is not what I do but the reason
why I do it which is chiefly of ethical value. The essence of virtue
resides in the will, not in the achievement; in the intention or
motive, not in the result.

III. The propriety of styling Ethics a science has sometimes been
questioned. Science, it is said, has to do with certain necessary and
uniform facts of experience; its object is simp