ed. The art of
goodness, of living nobly, if so unconscious a thing may be called an
art, is one certainly which defies complete scientific treatment. It
is with facts like these that Ethics has to do; and while we may lay
down broad general principles which must underlie the teaching of every
true prophet and the conduct of every good man, there will always be an
element with which science cannot cope.

IV. It will not be necessary, after what has been said, to trace at
any length the relations between Ethics and the {15} special mental
sciences, such as Logic, Aesthetics, and Politics.

1. _Logic_ is the science of the formal laws of thought, and is
concerned not with the truth of phenomena, but merely with the laws of
correct reasoning about them. Ethics establishes the laws according to
which we ought to act. Logic legislates for the reason, and decerns
the laws which the intellect must obey if it would think correctly.
Both sciences determine what is valid; but while Logic is confined to
the realm of what is valid in reasoning, Ethics is occupied with what
is valid in action. There is, indeed, a logic of life; and in so far
as all true conduct must have a rational element in it and be guided by
certain intelligible forms, Ethics may be described as a kind of logic
of character.

2. The connection between Ethics and _Aesthetics_ is closer.
Aesthetics is the science of the laws of beauty, while Ethics is the
science of the laws of the good. But in so far as Aesthetics deals
with the emotions rather than the reason it comes into contact with
Ethics in the psychological field. In its narrower sense Aesthetics
deals with beauty merely in an impersonal way; and its immediate object
is not what is morally beautiful, but rather that which is beautiful in
itself irrespective of moral considerations. Ethics, on the other
hand, is concerned with personal worth as expressed in perfection of
will and action. Conduct may be beautiful and character may afford
Aesthetic satisfaction, but Ethics, in so far as it is concerned with
judgments of virtue, is independent of all thought of the mere beauty
or utility of conduct. Aesthetic consideration may indeed aid
practical morality, but it is not identical with it. It is conceivable
that what is right may not be immediately beautiful, and may indeed in
its pursuit or realisation involve action which contradicts our ideas
of beauty. But though both sciences have differ