h Aristotle the goal is confined to this life and is
conceived simply as the earthly well-being of the moral subject.
'Death,' he declares, 'is the greatest of all evils, for it is the
end.' Aristotle begins his great work on Ethics with the discussion of
the chief good, which he declares to be happiness or well-being. But
happiness does not consist in sensual pleasure, nor even in the pursuit
of honour, but in an 'activity of the soul in accordance with
reason.'[3] There are required for this life of right thinking and
right doing not only suitable environment but proper instruction.
Virtue is not virtuous until it is a habit, and the only way to be
virtuous is to practise virtue. To be virtuous a man's conduct must be
a law for him, the regular expression of his will. Hence the virtues
are habits of deliberate choice, and not natural endowments. Following
Plato, Aristotle sees that there is in man a number of impulses
struggling for the mastery of the soul, hence he is led to assume that
the natural instincts need guidance and control. Moderation is
therefore the one chief virtue; and moral excellence consists in an
activity which at every point seeks to strike a 'mean' between two
opposite excesses. Virtue in general, then, may be defined as the
observation of the due mean in action. Aristotle also follows Plato in
assigning the ideal good to contemplation, and in exalting the life of
reason and speculation above all others. In thus idealising the
contemplative life he was but reflecting the spirit of his race. This
apotheosis of knowledge infected all Greek thought, and found
exaggerated expression in the religious absorption of Neo-Platonism.

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Without dwelling further upon the ethical philosophy of Aristotle, a
defect which at once strikes a modern in regard to his scheme of
virtues is that benevolence is not recognised, except obscurely as a
form of magnanimity; and that, in general, the gentler virtues, so
prominent in Christianity, have little place in the list. The virtues
are chiefly aristocratic. Favourable conditions are needed for their
cultivation. They are not possible for a slave, and hardly for those
engaged in 'mercenary occupations.'[4] Further, it may be remarked
that habit of itself does not make a man virtuous. Morality cannot
consist in a mere succession of customary acts. 'One good custom would
corrupt the world,' and habit is frequently a hindrance rather than a
help to