ate to Congress this event, so unexpected and so injurious to
the interest of the country. One circumstance prevented the performance
of this duty and justified the omission. The notice of the rejection was
accompanied by information that the minister of France was instructed to
make explanations and engagements on the subject, and that a ship of
war would be dispatched with his instructions. The President had waited
a month for the arrival of this ship. An unusually long session of
Congress still afforded an opportunity for making the communication,
even after her arrival. If made it would undoubtedly have produced
consequences the nature of which may be imagined by considering the
events that have since occurred. It was necessary, then, to prevent an
interruption of the friendly relations between the two countries, that
this communication should be postponed until the subsequent session
of Congress; longer than that it was well known that it could not be
deferred. This was clearly and explicitly stated in a conference between
Mr. Serurier and the Secretary of State of the United States, in which
the former gave the promise in question. But the President desired to
have the engagement in a written and official form (and as Mr. Serurier
expresses it in his letter), "_pour des causes prises dans les
necessites de votre Gouvernement_" What governmental necessity does he
allude to? Clearly that which obliged the President to communicate these
engagements to Congress at the next session.
Here, then, we have a stipulation made under special orders, sent
out by a ship dispatched for that express purpose, communicated first
verbally in an official conference, afterwards reduced to writing and
delivered to the proper officers, for the double purpose of justifying
the President for not making an immediate communication at their then
session and also to serve as a pledge which he might exhibit if
unredeemed at their next. These objects are well stated by Mr. Serurier
to be "that the Government of the Republic may avoid, with a
providential solicitude, _in this unsettled state of things_ all that
may become a cause of new irritation between the two countries, endanger
the treaty, and raise obstacles that may become insurmountable to the
views of conciliation and harmony which animate the councils of the
King." It was, then, to avoid a communication to Congress, which Mr.
Serurier saw would endanger the peace of the two countries,
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