d for it by the framers of the Constitution.

But the more extended and injurious consequences likely to result
from a policy which would collect a surplus revenue for the purpose of
distributing it may be forcibly illustrated by an examination of the
effects already produced by the present deposit act. This act, although
certainly designed to secure the safe-keeping of the public revenue,
is not entirely free in its tendencies from any of the objections which
apply to this principle of distribution. The Government had without
necessity received from the people a large surplus, which, instead
of being employed as heretofore and returned to them by means of the
public expenditure, was deposited with sundry banks. The banks proceeded
to make loans upon this surplus, and thus converted it into banking
capital, and in this manner it has tended to multiply bank charters
and has had a great agency in producing a spirit of wild speculation.
The possession and use of the property out of which this surplus was
created belonged to the people, but the Government has transferred its
possession to incorporated banks, whose interest and effort it is to
make large profits out of its use. This process need only be stated
to show its injustice and bad policy.

And the same observations apply to the influence which is produced by
the steps necessary to collect as well as to distribute such a revenue.
About three-fifths of all the duties on imports are paid in the city
of New York, but it is obvious that the means to pay those duties are
drawn from every quarter of the Union. Every citizen in every State who
purchases and consumes an article which has paid a duty at that port
contributes to the accumulating mass. The surplus collected there must
therefore be made up of moneys or property withdrawn from other points
and other States. Thus the wealth and business of every region from
which these surplus funds proceed must be to some extent injured, while
that of the place where the funds are concentrated and are employed in
banking are proportionably extended. But both in making the transfer
of the funds which are first necessary to pay the duties and collect
the surplus and in making the retransfer which becomes necessary when
the time arrives for the distribution of that surplus there is a
considerable period when the funds can not be brought into use, and it
is manifest that, besides the loss inevitable from such an operation,
its tende