evenue for the purpose of distributing it.
Congress is only authorized to levy taxes "_to pay the debts and provide
for the common defense and general welfare of the United States_." There
is no such provision as would authorize Congress to collect together the
property of the country, under the name of revenue, for the purpose of
dividing it equally or unequally among the States or the people. Indeed,
it is not probable that such an idea ever occurred to the States when
they adopted the Constitution. But however this may be, the only safe
rule for us in interpreting the powers granted to the Federal Government
is to regard the absence of express authority to touch a subject so
important and delicate as this is as equivalent to a prohibition.

Even if our powers were less doubtful in this respect as the
Constitution now stands, there are considerations afforded by recent
experience which would seem to make it our duty to avoid a resort to
such a system.

All will admit that the simplicity and economy of the State governments
mainly depend on the fact that money has to be supplied to support them
by the same men, or their agents, who vote it away in appropriations.
Hence when there are extravagant and wasteful appropriations there must
be a corresponding increase of taxes, and the people, becoming awakened,
will necessarily scrutinize the character of measures which thus
increase their burdens. By the watchful eye of self-interest the agents
of the people in the State governments are repressed and kept within
the limits of a just economy. But if the necessity of levying the
taxes be taken from those who make the appropriations and thrown upon
a more distant and less responsible set of public agents, who have
power to approach the people by an indirect and stealthy taxation,
there is reason to fear that prodigality will soon supersede those
characteristics which have thus far made us look with so much pride and
confidence to the State governments as the mainstay of our Union and
liberties. The State legislatures, instead of studying to restrict their
State expenditures to the smallest possible sum, will claim credit
for their profusion, and harass the General Government for increased
supplies. Practically there would soon be but one taxing power, and
that vested in a body of men far removed from the people, in which the
farming and mechanic interests would scarcely be represented. The States
would gradually lose their pu