rity as well as their independence; they
would not dare to murmur at the proceedings of the General Government,
lest they should lose their supplies; all would be merged in a practical
consolidation, cemented by widespread corruption, which could only
be eradicated by one of those bloody revolutions which occasionally
overthrow the despotic systems of the Old World. In all the other
aspects in which I have been able to look at the effect of such a
principle of distribution upon the best interests of the country I
can see nothing to compensate for the disadvantages to which I have
adverted. If we consider the protective duties, which are in a great
degree the source of the surplus revenue, beneficial to one section of
the Union and prejudicial to another, there is no corrective for the
evil in such a plan of distribution. On the contrary, there is reason to
fear that all the complaints which have sprung from this cause would be
aggravated. Everyone must be sensible that a distribution of the surplus
must beget a disposition to cherish the means which create it, and any
system, therefore, into which it enters must have a powerful tendency to
increase rather than diminish the tariff. If it were even admitted that
the advantages of such a system could be made equal to all the sections
of the Union, the reasons already so urgently calling for a reduction of
the revenue would nevertheless lose none of their force, for it will
always be improbable that an intelligent and virtuous community can
consent to raise a surplus for the mere purpose of dividing it,
diminished as it must inevitably be by the expenses of the various
machinery necessary to the process.

The safest and simplest mode of obviating all the difficulties which
have been mentioned is to collect only revenue enough to meet the wants
of the Government, and let the people keep the balance of their property
in their own hands, to be used for their own profit. Each State will
then support its own government and contribute its due share toward the
support of the General Government. There would be no surplus to cramp
and lessen the resources of individual wealth and enterprise, and the
banks would be left to their ordinary means. Whatever agitations and
fluctuations might arise from our unfortunate paper system, they could
never be attributed, justly or unjustly, to the action of the Federal
Government. There would be some guaranty that the spirit of wild
speculation w