the bill. It sets out with the assumption that there is a currency
established by law (i. e., gold and silver); and it further assumes that
the public revenue of all descriptions ought to be collected exclusively
in such legal currency, or in bank notes of a certain character; and
therefore it provides that the Secretary of the Treasury _shall_ take
measures to effect a collection of the revenue "in the legal currency
of the United States, _or_ in notes of banks which are payable and paid
on demand in the said legal currency," under certain restrictions,
afterwards mentioned in the act.

The question then arises: Are bank notes having the requisite
characteristics placed by the clause just quoted on the same footing
with the legal currency, so as to make it the duty of the Secretary of
the Treasury to allow the receipt of them when tendered by the debtor?
In my judgment, such is not the effect of the provision.

If Congress had intended to make so important an alteration of the
existing law as to compel the receiving officers to take payment in the
bank notes described in the bill, the natural phraseology would have
been, "in the legal currency of the United States _and_ in notes of
banks which are payable and paid in the legal currency," etc. And it is
reasonable to presume that Congress would have used such, phraseology,
or would have gone on to make a distinct provision expressly declaring
that such bank notes _should be receivable, _as was done in the bank
charters of 1790 and 1816, and as was also done by the acts relative to
evidences of debt, Treasury notes, and Virginia land scrip. The form of
one of these provisions (the fourteenth section of the act incorporating
the late Bank of the United States) will illustrate the idea I desire
to present:

"SEC. 14. _And be it further enacted, _That the bills or notes of the
said corporation, originally made payable, or which shall have become
payable, on demand, _shall be receivable _in all payments to the United
States, unless otherwise directed by act of Congress."

The difference between the language there used and that employed in the
present bill is too obvious to require comment. It is true that the word
"or," when it occurs in wills and agreements, is sometimes construed to
mean "and," in order to give effect to the plain intent of the parties;
and such a construction of the word may sometimes be given when it
occurs in statutes, where the general intent of th