ncy is to produce fluctuations in the business of the country,
which are always productive of speculation and detrimental to the
interests of regular trade. Argument can scarcely be necessary to
show that a measure of this character ought not to receive further
legislative encouragement.
By examining the practical operation of the ratio for distribution
adopted in the deposit bill of the last session we shall discover other
features that appear equally objectionable. Let it be assumed, for the
sake of argument, that the surplus moneys to be deposited with the
States have been collected and belong to them in the ratio of their
federal representative population--an assumption founded upon the fact
that any deficiencies in our future revenue from imposts and public
lands must be made up by direct taxes collected from the States in that
ratio. It is proposed to distribute this surplus--say $30,000,000--not
according to the ratio in which it has been collected and belongs to
the people of the States, but in that of their votes in the colleges of
electors of President and Vice-President. The effect of a distribution
upon that ratio is shown by the annexed table, marked A.
By an examination of that table it will be perceived that in the
distribution of a surplus of $30,000,000 upon that basis there is a
great departure from the principle which regards representation as the
true measure of taxation, and it will be found that the tendency of that
departure will be to increase whatever inequalities have been supposed
to attend the operation of our federal system in respect to its bearings
upon the different interests of the Union. In making the basis of
representation the basis of taxation the framers of the Constitution
intended to equalize the burdens which are necessary to support the
Government, and the adoption of that ratio, while it accomplished this
object, was also the means of adjusting other great topics arising out
of the conflicting views respecting the political equality of the
various members of the Confederacy. Whatever, therefore, disturbs the
liberal spirit of the compromises which established a rule of taxation
so just and equitable, and which experience has proved to be so well
adapted to the genius and habits of our people, should be received with
the greatest caution and distrust.
A bare inspection in the annexed table of the differences produced
by the ratio used in the deposit act compared with the re
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