ave died. If we refuse the name of Induction to the general
proposition of fact, what are we to call it? The truth is that the
reason why the word Induction is applied indifferently to the general
proposition of fact and the general proposition applicable to all
time is that, once we are sure of the facts, the transition to the
inference is so simple an affair that it has not been found necessary
in practice to distinguish them by different names.

Our criticism of Mill would itself mislead if it were taken to mean
that the methods of science which he formulated are not the methods
of science or that his system of those methods is substantially
incomplete. His Inductive Logic as a system of scientific method was
a great achievement in organisation, a veritable _Novum Organum_ of
knowledge. What kept him substantially right was that the methods
which he systematised were taken from the practice of men of science.
Our criticism amounts only to this, that in correlating the new system
with the old he went upon a wrong track. For more than two centuries
Deduction had been opposed to Induction, the _ars disserendi_ to the
_ars inveniendi_. In trying to reconcile them and bring them under one
roof, Mill drew the bonds too tight. In stating the terms of the union
between the two partners, he did not separate their spheres of work
with sufficient distinctness.

Mill's theory of Deduction and Induction and the voluminous criticism
to which in its turn it has been subjected have undoubtedly been of
great service in clearing up the foundations of reasoning. But the
moral of it is that if we are to make the methods of Science a part of
Logic, and to name this department Induction, it is better to discard
altogether the questions of General and Particular which are pertinent
to Syllogism, and to recognise the new department simply as being
concerned with a different kind of inference, inference from facts to
what lies beyond them, inference from the observed to the unobserved.

That this is the general aim and proper work of Science is evident
from its history. Get at the secrets of Nature by the study of Nature,
penetrate to what is unknown and unexperienced by help of what is
known and has been experienced, was the cry of the early reformers of
Science. Thus only, in Roger Bacon's phrase, could certainty--assured,
well grounded, rational belief--be reached. This doctrine, like every
other, can be understood only by what it was i