FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204  
205   206   207   208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   >>   >|  
sfied about this question. He pointed out a difficulty which a mere belief in empirical continuity does not solve. Why do we believe more confidently in some uniformities than in others? Why would a reported breach of one be regarded with more incredulity than that of another? Suppose a traveller to return from a strange country and report that he had met men with heads growing beneath their shoulders, why would this be pronounced more incredible than a report that he had seen a grey crow? All crows hitherto observed have been black, and in all men hitherto observed the heads have been above the shoulders: if the mere continuity of observed uniformities is all that we go upon in our inferences, a breach of the one uniformity should be just as improbable as a breach of the other, neither more nor less. Mill admitted the difficulty, and remarked that whoever could solve it would have solved the problem of Induction. Now it seems to me that this particular difficulty may be solved, and yet leave another behind. It may be solved within the limits of the principle of emperical--meaning by that observational--continuity. The uniform blackness of the crow is an exception within a wider uniformity: the colour of animals is generally variable. Hence we are not so much surprised at the reported appearance of a grey crow: it is in accordance with the more general law. On the other hand, the uniform position of the head relative to other parts of the body is a uniformity as wide as the animal kingdom: it is a coincidence repeated as often as animals have been repeated, and merely on the principle that uniformities continue, it has an absolutely uncontradicted series in its favour. But is this principle really all that we assume? Do we not also assume that behind the observed fact uniformity, there is a cause for it, a cause that does not appear on the surface of the observation, but must be sought outside of its range? And do not the various degrees of confidence with which we expect a repetition of the coincidence, depend upon the extent of our knowledge of the producing causes and the mode of their operation? At bottom our belief in the continuance of the observed uniformities rests on a belief in the continuance of the producing causes, and till we know what these are our belief has an inferior warrant: there is less reason for our confidence. To go back to the illustrations with which we started. If we have met a man every
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193   194   195   196   197   198   199   200   201   202   203   204  
205   206   207   208   209   210   211   212   213   214   215   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

observed

 

uniformity

 

uniformities

 
belief
 
principle
 

breach

 
solved
 

continuity

 

difficulty

 

hitherto


producing
 

shoulders

 

assume

 

confidence

 

reported

 
coincidence
 

repeated

 

animals

 

report

 
uniform

continuance

 
absolutely
 

continue

 

relative

 

favour

 

series

 

uncontradicted

 
position
 

animal

 

kingdom


expect

 

inferior

 

bottom

 

warrant

 

reason

 

started

 

illustrations

 

operation

 

sought

 

surface


observation

 

extent

 

knowledge

 

depend

 

repetition

 

degrees

 
pronounced
 

incredible

 

beneath

 

country