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ribe it as an indispensable antecedent, with this reservation (which will be more fully understood afterwards), that if we speak of a general effect, such as death, the antecedents must be taken with corresponding generality. It is misleading to suggest, as Mill does, by defining cause as "the sum total of conditions"--a definition given to back up his conception of cause as phenomenal--that science uses the word cause in a different meaning from that of ordinary speech. It is quite true that "the cause, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together: the whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realised, the consequent invariably follows". But this does not imply any discrepancy between the scientific or philosophical meaning and the ordinary meaning. It is only another way of saying that the business of science or philosophy is to furnish a complete explanation of an event, an account of all its indispensable antecedents. The plain man would not refuse the name of cause to anything that science or philosophy could prove to be an indispensable antecedent, but his interest in explanation is more limited. It is confined to what he wants to know for the purpose he has in hand. Nor could the man of science consistently refuse the name of cause to what the plain man applies it to, if it really was something in consequence of which the event took place. Only his interest in explanation is different. The indispensable antecedents that he wants to know may not be the same. Science or philosophy applies itself to the satisfaction of a wider curiosity: it wants to know all the causes, the whole why, the sum total of conditions. To that end the various departments of science interest themselves in various species of conditions. But all understand the word cause in the ordinary sense. We must not conclude from accidental differences in explanation or statement of cause, dependent on the purpose in view, that the word Cause is used in different senses. In answering a question as to the cause of anything, we limit ourselves to what we suppose our interrogator to be ignorant of and desirous of knowing. If asked why the bells are ringing, we mention a royal marriage, or a victory, or a church meeting, or a factory dinner hour, or whatever the occasion may be. We do not consider it necessary to mention that the bells are struck by a clapper. Our hearer unders
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