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t statistics are lying here in the background, and are thus indirectly efficient in producing and graduating our belief, I fully hold; but there is such a large intermediate process of estimating, and such scope for the exercise of a practised judgment, that no direct appeal to statistics in the common sense can directly help us. In sketching out therefore the claims of an Ideal condition of knowledge, we ought clearly to include a due apportionment of belief to every event of such a class as this. It is an obvious defect that one man should regard as almost certain what another man regards as almost impossible. Short, therefore, of certain prevision of the future, we want complete agreement as to the degree of probability of every future event: and for that matter of every past event as well. Technically speaking, if we extend the name Modality (see p. 78) to any qualification of the certainty of a statement of belief, what Dr. Venn here desiderates, as he has himself suggested, is a more exact measurement of the Modality of propositions. We speak of things as being certain, possible, impossible, probable, extremely probable, faintly probable, and so forth: taking certainty as the highest degree of probability[2] shading gradually down to the zero of the impossible, can we obtain an exact numerical measure for the gradations of assurance? To examine the principles of all the cases in which chances for and against an occurrence have been calculated from real or hypothetical data, would be to trespass into the province of Mathematics, but a few simple cases will serve to show what it is that the calculus attempts to measure, and what is the practical value of the measurement as applied to the probability of a single event. Suppose there are 100 balls in a box, 30 white and 70 black, all being alike except in respect of colour, we say that the chances of drawing a black ball as against a white are as 7 to 3, and the probability of drawing black is measured by the fraction 7/10. In believing this we proceed on the principle already explained (p. 356) of Proportional Chances. We do not know for certain whether black or white will emerge, but knowing the antecedent situation we expect black rather than white with a degree of assurance corresponding to the proportions of the two in the box. It is our degree of rational assurance that we measure by this fraction, and t
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