ied and wounded by the Grecian archers
and darters in front, and most turned round, or were stopped. Those that
pressed on were let through the Macedonian lines without mischief. As at
Issus, Alexander did not attack the centre, where Darius was surrounded
with the choicest troops of the army, but advanced impetuously upon the
left wing, turned it, and advanced by a flank movement toward the centre,
where Darius was posted. The Persian king, seeing the failure of the
chariots, and the advancing troops of Alexander, lost his self-possession,
turned his chariot, and fled, as at Issus. Such folly and cowardice led,
of course, to instant defeat and rout; and nothing was left for the
victor, but to pursue and destroy the disorderly fugitives, so that the
slaughter was immense. But while the left and centre of the Persians were
put to flight, the right fought vigorously, and might have changed the
fortune of the day, had not Alexander seasonably returned from the
pursuit, and attacked the left in the rear and flank. Then all was lost,
and headlong flight marked the Persian hosts. The battle was lost by the
cowardice of Darius, who insisted, with strange presumption, on commanding
in person. Half the troops, under an able general, would have overwhelmed
the Macedonian army, even with Alexander at the head. But the Persians had
no leader of courage and skill, and were a mere rabble. According to some
accounts, three hundred thousand Persians were slain, and not more than
one hundred Macedonians. There was no attempt on the part of Darius to
rally or collect a new army. His cause and throne were irretrievably lost,
and he was obliged to fly to his farthest provinces, pursued by the
conqueror. The battle of Arbela was the death-blow to the Persian empire.
We can not help feeling sentiments of indignation in view of such wretched
management on the part of the Persians, thus throwing away an empire. But,
on the other hand, we are also compelled to admit the extraordinary
generalship of Alexander, who brought into action every part of his army,
while at least three-quarters of the Persians were mere spectators, so
that his available force was really great. His sagacious combinations, his
perception of the weak points of his adversary, and the instant advantage
which he seized--his insight, rapidity of movement, and splendid
organization, made him irresistible against any Persian array of numbers,
without skill. Indeed, the Persian army