on, to give clear
conceptions of this famous battle. Hannibal, it would seem, like
Epaminondas and Alexander, brought to bear his heavy cavalry, under
Hasdrubal, upon the weakest point of the enemy, after the conflict had
continued awhile without decisive results. The weaker right of the Roman
army, led by Paulus, after bravely fighting, were cut down and driven
across the river. Paulus, wounded, then rode to the centre, composed of
infantry in close lines, which had gained an advantage over the Spanish
and Gaulish troops that encountered them. In order to follow up this
advantage, the legions pressed forward in the form of a wedge. In this
position the Libyan infantry, wheeling upon them right and left, warmly
assailed both sides of the Roman infantry, which checked its advance. By
this double flank attack the Roman infantry became crowded, and were not
free. Meanwhile, Hasdrubal, after defeating the right wing, which had been
led by Paulus, led his cavalry behind the Roman centre and attacked the
left wing, led by Varro. The cavalry of Varro, opposed by the Numidian
cavalry, was in no condition to meet this double attack, and was
scattered. Hasdrubal again rallied his cavalry, and led it to the rear of
the Roman centre, already in close fight with the Spanish and Gaulish
infantry. This last charge decided the battle. Flight was impossible, for
the river was in the rear, and in front was a victorious enemy. No quarter
was given. Seventy thousand Romans were slain, including the consul Paulus
and eighty men of senatorial rank. Varro was saved by the speed of his
horse. The Carthaginians lost not quite six thousand.

(M861) This immense disaster was the signal for the revolt of the allies,
which Hannibal before in vain had sought to procure. Capua opened her
gates to the conqueror. Nearly all the people of Southern Italy rose
against Rome. But the Greek cities of the coast were held by Roman
garrisons, as well as the fortresses in Apulia, Campania, and Samnium. The
news of the battle of Cannae, B.C. 216, induced the Macedonian king to
promise aid to Hannibal. The death of Hiero at Syracuse made Sicily an
enemy to Rome, while Carthage, now elated, sent considerable
re-enforcements.

(M862) Many critics have expressed surprise that Hannibal, after this
great victory, did not at once march upon Rome. Had he conquered, as
Alexander did, a Persian, Oriental, effeminate people, this might have
been his true policy. But Rome w