ith the
Carthaginians.
(M859) Fabius, the dictator, a man of great prudence, advanced in years,
and a tactitian of the old Roman school, determined to avoid a pitched
battle, and starve or weary out his enemy. Hannibal adjusted his plans in
accordance with the character of the man he opposed. So he passed the
Roman army, crossed the Appenines, took Telesia, and turned against Capua,
the most important of all the Italian dependent cities, hoping for a
revolt among the Campanian towns. Here again he was disappointed. So,
retracing his steps, he took the road to Apulia, the dictator following
him along the heights. So the summer was consumed by marchings and
counter-marchings, the lands of the Hispanians, Campamans, Samnites,
Paelignians, and other provinces, being successively devastated. But no
important battle was fought. He selected then the rich lands of Apulia for
winter quarters, and intrenched his camp at Gerenium. The Romans formed a
camp in the territory of the Larinates, and harassed the enemy's foragers.
This defensive policy of Fabius wounded the Roman pride, and the dictator
became unpopular. The Senate resolved to depart from a policy which was
slowly but surely ruining the State, and an army was equipped larger than
Rome ever before sent into the field, composed of eight legions, under the
command of the two consuls, L. AEmilius Paulus, and M. Terentius Varro. The
former, a patrician, had conducted successfully the Illyrian war; the
latter, the popular candidate, incapable, conceited, and presumptuous.
(M860) As soon as the season allowed him to leave his winter-quarters,
Hannibal, assuming the offensive, marched out of Gerenium, passed Luceria,
crossed the Aufidus, and took the citadel of Cannae, which commanded the
plain of Canusium. The Roman consuls arrived in Apulia in the beginning of
the summer, with eighty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry.
Hannibal's force was forty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry,
inured to regular warfare. The Romans made up their minds to fight, and
confronted the Carthaginians on the right bank of the Aufidus. According
to a foolish custom, the command devolved on one of the consuls every
other day, and Varro determined to avail himself of the first opportunity
for a battle. The forces met on the plain west of Cannae, more favorable to
the Carthaginians than the Romans, on account of the superiority of the
cavalry. It is difficult, without a long descripti
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