l and executory duties of government. The latter were alone to be
responsible; whilst the real advisers, who enjoyed all the power, were
effectually removed from all the danger.

Secondly, _A party under these leaders was to be formed in favor of the
court against the ministry_: this party was to have a large share in the
emoluments of government, and to hold it totally separate from, and
independent of, ostensible administration.

The third point, and that on which the success of the whole scheme
ultimately depended, was _to bring Parliament to an acquiescence in this
project_. Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total
indifference to the persons, rank, influence, abilities, connections,
and character of the ministers of the crown. By means of a discipline,
on which I shall say more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to
the most opposite interests, and the most discordant politics. All
connections and dependencies among subjects were to be entirely
dissolved. As, hitherto, business had gone through the hands of leaders
of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to conciliate the people, and to
engage their confidence; now the method was to be altered: and the lead
was to be given to men of no sort of consideration or credit in the
country. This want of natural importance was to be their very title to
delegated power. Members of Parliament were to be hardened into an
insensibility to pride as well as to duty. Those high and haughty
sentiments, which are the great support of independence, were to be let
down gradually. Points of honor and precedence were no more to be
regarded in Parliamentary decorum than in a Turkish army. It was to be
avowed, as a constitutional maxim, that the king might appoint one of
his footmen, or one of your footmen for minister; and that he ought to
be, and that he would be, as well followed as the first name for rank or
wisdom in the nation. Thus Parliament was to look on as if perfectly
unconcerned, while a cabal of the closet and back-stairs was substituted
in the place of a national administration.

With such a degree of acquiescence, any measure of any court might well
be deemed thoroughly secure. The capital objects, and by much the most
flattering characteristics of arbitrary power, would be obtained.
Everything would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the
personal favor and inclination of the prince. This favor would be the
sole introduction to power, and the o