em; an inclination rather to
countenance a strong use of authority, than to bear any sort of
licentiousness on the part of the people; these are unfavorable
qualities in an open election for members of Parliament.

The instinct which carries the people towards the choice of the former,
is justified by reason; because a man of such a character, even in its
exorbitances, does not directly contradict the purposes of a trust, the
end of which is a control on power. The latter character, even when it
is not in its extreme, will execute this trust but very imperfectly;
and, if deviating to the least excess, will certainly frustrate instead
of forwarding the purposes of a control on government. But when the
House of Commons was to be new modelled, this principle was not only to
be changed but reversed. Whilst any errors committed in support of power
were left to the law, with every advantage of favorable construction, of
mitigation, and finally of pardon; all excesses on the side of liberty,
or in pursuit of popular favor, or in defence of popular rights and
privileges, were not only to be punished by the rigor of the known law,
but by a _discretionary_ proceeding, which brought on _the loss of the
popular object itself_. Popularity was to be rendered, if not directly
penal, at least highly dangerous. The favor of the people might lead
even to a disqualification of representing them. Their odium might
become, strained through the medium of two or three constructions, the
means of sitting as the trustee of all that was dear to them. This is
punishing the offence in the offending part. Until this time, the
opinion of the people, through the power of an assembly, still in some
sort popular, led to the greatest honors and emoluments in the gift of
the crown. Now the principle is reversed; and the favor of the court is
the only sure way of obtaining and holding those honors which ought to
be in the disposal of the people.

It signifies very little how this matter may be quibbled away. Example,
the only argument of effect in civil life, demonstrates the truth of my
proposition. Nothing can alter my opinion concerting the pernicious
tendency of this example, until I see some man for his indiscretion in
the support of power, for his violent and intemperate servility,
rendered incapable of sitting in Parliament. For as it now stands, the
fault of overstraining popular qualities, and, irregularly if you
please, asserting popular privil