particular description of
revenue-officers from seats in Parliament; or, perhaps, of all the lower
sorts of them from votes in elections. In the former case, only the few
are affected; in the latter, only the inconsiderable. But a great
official, a great professional, a great military and naval interest, all
necessarily comprehending many people of the first weight, ability,
wealth, and spirit, has been gradually formed in the kingdom. These new
interests must be let into a share of representation, else possibly they
may be inclined to destroy those institutions of which they are not
permitted to partake. This is not a thing to be trifled with; nor is it
every well-meaning man that is fit to put his hands to it. Many other
serious considerations occur. I do not open them here, because they are
not directly to my purpose; proposing only to give the reader some taste
of the difficulties that attend all capital changes in the constitution;
just to hint the uncertainty, to say no worse, of being able to prevent
the court, as long as it has the means of influence abundantly in its
power, of applying that influence to Parliament; and perhaps, if the
public method were precluded, of doing it in some worse and more
dangerous method. Underhand and oblique ways would be studied. The
science of evasion, already tolerably understood, would then be brought
to the greatest perfection. It is no inconsiderable part of wisdom, to
know how much of an evil ought to be tolerated; lest, by attempting a
degree of purity impracticable in degenerate times and manners, instead
of cutting off the subsisting ill-practices, new corruptions might be
produced for the concealment and security of the old. It were better,
undoubtedly, that no influence at all could affect the mind of a member
of Parliament. But of all modes of influence, in my opinion, a place
under the government is the least disgraceful to the man who holds it,
and by far the most safe to the country. I would not shut out that sort
of influence which is open and visible, which is connected with the
dignity and the service of the state, when it is not in my power to
prevent the influence of contracts, of subscriptions, of direct bribery,
and those innumerable methods of clandestine corruption, which are
abundantly in the hands of the court, and which will be applied as long
as these means of corruption, and the disposition to be corrupted, have
existence amongst us. Our constitution st