atsoever. It had always,
until of late, been held the first duty of Parliament _to refuse to
support government, until power was in the hands of persons who were
acceptable to the people, or while factions predominated in the court in
which the nation had no confidence_. Thus all the good effects of
popular election were supposed to be secured to us, without the
mischiefs attending on perpetual intrigue, and a distinct canvass for
every particular office throughout the body of the people. This was the
most noble and refined part of our constitution. The people, by their
representatives and grandees, were intrusted with a deliberative power
in making laws; the king with the control of his negative. The king was
intrusted with the deliberative choice and the election to office; the
people had the negative in a Parliamentary refusal to support. Formerly
this power of control was what kept ministers in awe of Parliaments, and
Parliaments in reverence with the people. If the use of this power of
control on the system and persons of administration is gone, everything
is lost, Parliament and all. We may assure ourselves, that if Parliament
will tamely see evil men take possession of all the strongholds of their
country, and allow them time and means to fortify themselves, under a
pretence of giving them a fair trial, and upon a hope of discovering,
whether they will not be reformed by power, and whether their measures
will not be better than their morals; such a Parliament will give
countenance to their measures also, whatever that Parliament may
pretend, and whatever those measures may be.

Every good political institution must have a preventive operation as
well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad
men from government, and not to trust for the safety of the state to
subsequent punishment alone; punishment, which has ever been tardy and
uncertain; and which, when power is suffered in bad hands, may chance to
fall rather on the injured than the criminal.

Before men are put forward into the great trusts of the state, they
ought by their conduct to have obtained such a degree of estimation in
their country, as may be some sort of pledge and security to the public,
that they will not abuse those trusts. It is no mean security for a
proper use of power, that a man has shown by the general tenor of his
actions, that the affection, the good opinion, the confidence of his
fellow-citizens have been among