are wanting, to induce the leading men to engage. But while the
ministers of the day appear in all the pomp and pride of power, while
they have all their canvas spread out to the wind, and every sail filled
with the fair and prosperous gale of royal favor, in a short time they
find, they know not how, a current, which sets directly against them:
which prevents all progress; and even drives them backwards. They grow
ashamed and mortified in a situation, which, by its vicinity to power,
only serves to remind them the more strongly of their insignificance.
They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors, or to
see themselves opposed by the natural instruments of their office. With
the loss of their dignity they lose their temper. In their turn they
grow troublesome to that cabal which, whether it supports or opposes,
equally disgraces and equally betrays them. It is soon found necessary
to get rid of the heads of administration; but it is of the heads only.
As there always are many rotten members belonging to the best
connections, it is not hard to persuade several to continue in office
without their leaders. By this means the party goes out much thinner
than it came in; and is only reduced in strength by its temporary
possession of power. Besides, if by accident, or in course of changes,
that power should be recovered, the junto have thrown up a retrenchment
of these carcasses, which may serve to cover themselves in a day of
danger. They conclude, not unwisely, that such rotten members will
become the first objects of disgust and resentment to their ancient
connections.

They contrive to form in the outward administration two parties at the
least; which, whilst they are tearing one another to pieces, are both
competitors for the favor and protection of the cabal; and, by their
emulation, contribute to throw everything more and more into the hands
of the interior managers.

A minister of state will sometimes keep himself totally estranged from
all his colleagues; will differ from them in their councils, will
privately traverse, and publicly oppose, their measures. He will,
however, continue in his employment. Instead of suffering any mark of
displeasure, he will be distinguished by an unbounded profusion of court
rewards and caresses; because he does what is expected, and all that is
expected, from men in office. He helps to keep some form of
administration in being, and keeps it at the same time as weak