ermitted to
do it.

I see, in the judge's speech here, a short sentence in these words: "Our
fathers, when they formed this government under which we live, understood
this question just as well, and even better than, we do now." That is
true; I stick to that. I will stand by Judge Douglas in that to the bitter
end. And now, Judge Douglas, come and stand by me, and truthfully show how
they acted, understanding it better than we do. All I ask of you, Judge
Douglas, is to stick to the proposition that the men of the Revolution
understood this subject better than we do now, and with that better
understanding they acted better than you are trying to act now.

I wish to say something now in regard to the Dred Scott decision, as dealt
with by Judge Douglas. In that "memorable debate" between Judge Douglas
and myself, last year, the judge thought fit to commence a process of
catechising me, and at Freeport I answered his questions, and propounded
some to him. Among others propounded to him was one that I have here now.
The substance, as I remember it, is, "Can the people of a United States
Territory, under the Dred Scott decision, in any lawful way, against the
wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits,
prior to the formation of a State constitution?" He answered that they
could lawfully exclude slavery from the United States Territories,
notwithstanding the Dred Scot decision. There was something about that
answer that has probably been a trouble to the judge ever since.

The Dred Scott decision expressly gives every citizen of the United States
a right to carry his slaves into the United States Territories. And now
there was some inconsistency in saying that the decision was right, and
saying, too, that the people of the Territory could lawfully drive slavery
out again. When all the trash, the words, the collateral matter, was
cleared away from it, all the chaff was fanned out of it, it was a bare
absurdity,--no less than that a thing may be lawfully driven away from
where it has a lawful right to be. Clear it of all the verbiage, and
that is the naked truth of his proposition,--that a thing may be lawfully
driven from the place where it has a lawful right to stay. Well, it was
because the judge could n't help seeing this that he has had so much
trouble with it; and what I want to ask your especial attention to, just
now, is to remind you, if you have not noticed the fact, that the judge
does