not any longer say that the people can exclude slavery. He does not
say so in the copyright essay; he did not say so in the speech that he
made here; and, so far as I know, since his re-election to the Senate he
has never said, as he did at Freeport, that the people of the Territories
can exclude slavery. He desires that you, who wish the Territories to
remain free, should believe that he stands by that position; but he does
not say it himself. He escapes to some extent the absurd position I have
stated, by changing his language entirely. What he says now is something
different in language, and we will consider whether it is not different
in sense too. It is now that the Dred Scott decision, or rather the
Constitution under that decision, does not carry slavery into the
Territories beyond the power of the people of the Territories to control
it as other property. He does not say the people can drive it out, but
they can control it as other property. The language is different; we
should consider whether the sense is different. Driving a horse out of
this lot is too plain a proposition to be mistaken about; it is putting
him on the other side of the fence. Or it might be a sort of exclusion of
him from the lot if you were to kill him and let the worms devour him;
but neither of these things is the same as "controlling him as other
property." That would be to feed him, to pamper him, to ride him, to use
and abuse him, to make the most money out of him, "as other property";
but, please you, what do the men who are in favor of slavery want more
than this? What do they really want, other than that slavery, being in the
Territories, shall be controlled as other property? If they want anything
else, I do not comprehend it. I ask your attention to this, first, for the
purpose of pointing out the change of ground the judge has made; and, in
the second place, the importance of the change,--that that change is not
such as to give you gentlemen who want his popular sovereignty the power
to exclude the institution or drive it out at all. I know the judge
sometimes squints at the argument that in controlling it as other property
by unfriendly legislation they may control it to death; as you might, in
the case of a horse, perhaps, feed him so lightly and ride him so much
that he would die. But when you come to legislative control, there is
something more to be attended to. I have no doubt, myself, that if the
Territories should undertake