to control slave property as other property
that is, control it in such a way that it would be the most valuable as
property, and make it bear its just proportion in the way of burdens
as property, really deal with it as property,--the Supreme Court of the
United States will say, "God speed you, and amen." But I undertake to
give the opinion, at least, that if the Territories attempt by any direct
legislation to drive the man with his slave out of the Territory, or to
decide that his slave is free because of his being taken in there, or to
tax him to such an extent that he cannot keep him there, the Supreme Court
will unhesitatingly decide all such legislation unconstitutional, as long
as that Supreme Court is constructed as the Dred Scott Supreme Court is.
The first two things they have already decided, except that there is a
little quibble among lawyers between the words "dicta" and "decision."
They have already decided a negro cannot be made free by Territorial
legislation.
What is the Dred Scott decision? Judge Douglas labors to show that it is
one thing, while I think it is altogether different. It is a long opinion,
but it is all embodied in this short statement: "The Constitution of the
United States forbids Congress to deprive a man of his property, without
due process of law; the right of property in slaves is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in that Constitution: therefore, if Congress shall
undertake to say that a man's slave is no longer his slave when he crosses
a certain line into a Territory, that is depriving him of his property
without due process of law, and is unconstitutional." There is the whole
Dred Scott decision. They add that if Congress cannot do so itself,
Congress cannot confer any power to do so; and hence any effort by the
Territorial Legislature to do either of these things is absolutely decided
against. It is a foregone conclusion by that court.
Now, as to this indirect mode by "unfriendly legislation," all lawyers
here will readily understand that such a proposition cannot be tolerated
for a moment, because a legislature cannot indirectly do that which it
cannot accomplish directly. Then I say any legislation to control this
property, as property, for its benefit as property, would be hailed by
this Dred Scott Supreme Court, and fully sustained; but any legislation
driving slave property out, or destroying it as property, directly or
indirectly, will most assuredly, by that court, be
|