re for his great principle of nonintervention by the
government in the question of slavery in the Territories, while history
shows that they decided, in the cases actually brought before them, in
exactly the contrary way, and he knows it. Not only did they so decide
at that time, but they stuck to it during sixty years, through thick and
thin, as long as there was one of the Revolutionary heroes upon the stage
of political action. Through their whole course, from first to last, they
clung to freedom. And now he asks the community to believe that the men
of the Revolution were in favor of his great principle, when we have the
naked history that they themselves dealt with this very subject matter
of his principle, and utterly repudiated his principle, acting upon
a precisely contrary ground. It is as impudent and absurd as if a
prosecuting attorney should stand up before a jury and ask them to convict
A as the murderer of B, while B was walking alive before them.

I say, again, if judge Douglas asserts that the men of the Revolution
acted upon principles by which, to be consistent with themselves, they
ought to have adopted his popular sovereignty, then, upon a consideration
of his own argument, he had a right to make you believe that they
understood the principles of government, but misapplied them, that he
has arisen to enlighten the world as to the just application of this
principle. He has a right to try to persuade you that he understands their
principles better than they did, and, therefore, he will apply them now,
not as they did, but as they ought to have done. He has a right to go
before the community and try to convince them of this, but he has no right
to attempt to impose upon any one the belief that these men themselves
approved of his great principle. There are two ways of establishing a
proposition. One is by trying to demonstrate it upon reason, and the other
is, to show that great men in former times have thought so and so, and
thus to pass it by the weight of pure authority. Now, if Judge Douglas
will demonstrate somehow that this is popular sovereignty,--the right of
one man to make a slave of another, without any right in that other or
any one else to object,--demonstrate it as Euclid demonstrated
propositions,--there is no objection. But when he comes forward, seeking
to carry a principle by bringing to it the authority of men who themselves
utterly repudiate that principle, I ask that he shall not be p