usual casual way, though with none of that
hesitancy to which they had grown accustomed, Lincoln announced his
new policy, adding that he "wished it understood that the question was
settled in his own mind; that he had decreed emancipation in a certain
contingency and the responsibility of the measure was his."(3) President
and Cabinet talked it over in their customary offhand way, and Seward
made a suggestion that instantly riveted Lincoln's attention. Seward
thought the moment was ill-chosen. "If the Proclamation were issued now,
it would be received and considered as a despairing cry--a shriek from
and for the Administration, rather than for freedom."(4) He added
the picturesque phrase, "The government stretching forth its hands
to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the
government." This idea struck Lincoln with very great force. It was an
aspect of the case "which he had entirely overlooked."(5) He accepted
Seward's advice, laid aside the proclamation he had drafted and turned
again with all his energies to the organization of victory.

The next day Halleck arrived at Washington. He was one of Lincoln's
mistakes. However, in his new mood, Lincoln was resolved to act on his
own opinion of the evidence before him, especially in estimating men. It
is just possible that this epoch of his audacities began in a reaction;
that after too much self-distrust, he went briefly to the other extreme,
indulging in too much self-confidence. Be that as it may, he had formed
exaggerated opinions of both these Western generals, Halleck and
Pope. Somehow, in the brilliant actions along the Mississippi they had
absorbed far more than their fair share of credit. Particularly, Lincoln
went astray with regard to Pope. Doubtless a main reason why he accepted
the plan of campaign suggested by Halleck was the opportunity which it
offered to Pope. Perhaps, too, the fatality in McClellan's character
turned the scale. He begged to be left where he was with his base on
James River, and to be allowed to renew the attack on Richmond.1 But
he did not take the initiative. The government must swiftly hurry
up reinforcements, and then--the old, old story! Obviously, it was a
question at Washington either of superseding McClellan and leaving
the army where it was, or of shifting the army to some other commander
without in so many words disgracing McClellan. Halleck's approval of the
latter course jumped with two of Lincoln's impu