e not the
acts of the President, and that in relation to France, if the President
should change his policy, the imperial Government would be duly in
formed.(5)

It was Lincoln's fate to see his policy once again at the mercy of his
Commanding General. That was his situation in the spring of 1862 when
everything hung on McClellan who failed him; again in the autumn of
the year when McClellan so narrowly saved him. The spring of 1864
paralleled, in this respect, that other spring two years earlier. To be
sure, Lincoln's position was now much stronger; he had a great personal
following on which he relied. But just how strong it was he did not
know. He was taking a great risk forcing a policy high-handed in
defiance of Congress, where all his bitterest enemies were entrenched,
glowering. If his General failed him now--

The man on whom this huge responsibility rested was Grant. Lincoln had
summoned him from the West and placed him at the head of all the
armies of the Republic. As to Halleck who had long since proved himself
perfectly useless, he was allowed to lapse into obscurity.

Grant has preserved in his Memoirs his first confidential talk with
Lincoln: "He told me he did not want to know what I proposed to do. But
he submitted a plan of campaign of his own that he wanted me to hear and
then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map of Virginia on which
he had evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and
Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the map two
streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that an army might
be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of those streams. We
would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries
would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listened respectfully,
but did not suggest that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks
while he was shutting us up."(6)

Grant set out for the front in Virginia. Lincoln's parting words were
this note: "Not expecting to see you again before the spring campaign
opens, I wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with
what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The
particulars of your plans I neither know nor seek to know. You are
vigilant and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude
any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any
great disaster or capture of our men in great numbers shall be avoided,
I kno