hat Proclamation is an assumption of powers dangerous to the rights
of citizens and to the perpetuity of a free people." The resolution was
rejected. Among those who voted NO was Stevens.(3) Indeed, the star of
the Jacobins was far down on the horizon.

But the Jacobins were not the men to give up the game until they were
certainly in the last ditch. Though their issues had been slipped out of
their hands; though for the moment at least, it was not good policy
to fight the President on a principle; it might still be possible to
recover their prestige on some other contention. The first of January
was approaching. The final proclamation of emancipation would bring
to an end the temporary alliance of the Administration and the
Abolitionists. Who could say what new pattern of affairs the political
kaleidoscope might not soon reveal? Surely the Jacobin cue was to busy
themselves, straightway, making trouble for the President. Principles
being unavailable, practices might do. And who was satisfied with the
way the war was going? To rouse the party against the Administration
on the ground of inefficient practices, of unsatisfactory military
progress, might be the first step toward regaining their former
dominance.

There was a feather in the wind that gave them hope. The ominous
first paragraph of the Emancipation Proclamation was evidence that
the President was still stubbornly for his own policy; that he had not
surrendered to the opposite view. But this was not their only strategic
hope. Lincoln's dealings with the army between September and December
might, especially if anything in his course proved to be mistaken,
deliver him into their hands.

Following Antietam, Lincoln had urged upon McClellan swift pursuit
of Lee. His despatches were strikingly different from those of the
preceding spring. That half apologetic tone had disappeared. Though they
did not command, they gave advice freely. The tone was at least that
of an equal who, while not an authority in this particular matter, is
entitled to express his views and to have them taken seriously.

"You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness?
Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the
enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal
in prowess and act upon that claim . . . one of the standard maxims of
war, as you know, is to operate upon the enemy's communications as
much as possible with