image, and to tell what kind
of capitals the pillars have, and whether the shafts are plain or
fluted. But at this point the students begin to object. "We have never
counted those pillars, and cannot be expected to know the number now."
In fact, few of them give the correct number, and those who have
reported clear and vivid images are little better off in this respect
than those whose images are dim and vague.

The image, then, does not give you facts that you did not observe in
the presence of the object. The substitute stimulus, which now recalls
the image, only recalls responses which you made when the real object
was the stimulus. If you looked at the object simply to get its
general appearance, the general appearance is all you can recall. If
you noted the color of the object, you can probably recall the color.
If you noted such details as the number of pillars, you can recall
these details. But the substitute stimulus that now arouses the image
is by no means the equivalent of the original peripheral stimulus in
making possible a variety of new reactions. Its only linkage is with
reactions actually made by you in response to the real object. The
substitute stimulus, such as the name of a building, became linked
with responses actually made by you, not with responses that you
simply might have made, when the object was present. This important
fact is closely related to the {373} unreliability of testimony that
was mentioned before under the head of "unintentional memory".
[Footnote: See pp. 346-348.] Facts recalled are facts previously
observed.

It is true, of course, that recalled facts can be compared and new
facts be observed by the comparison. We may recall how John looks, and
how James looks, and note the fact, not previously observed, that they
look alike. A great deal can be inferred in this way by a person who
is sitting in his room far from the objects thought about. But this
noting of the relationships of different objects is a very different
matter from observing what is there, in a single object or scene. What
is there can only be observed when you are there.

The Question of Non-Sensory Recall

Many observed facts are not strictly facts of sensation, though
observed by means of the senses. Let us suppose, for an example, that
your attention is caught by the bright green new leaves at the tips of
the branches of an evergreen tree in summer, and that you notice also
the darker green of the olde