t not be that the motor response is simply
reduced to a minimum? Or, still better, may it not be that perceiving
an object amounts to _getting ready_ to do something with it? May not
seeing a word always be a getting ready to say it, even if no actual
movement of the vocal organs occurs? May not seeing an orange consist
in getting ready to take it, peel it, and eat it? May not perceiving
our friend amount to the same thing as getting ready to behave in a
friendly manner, and perceiving our enemy amount to the same thing as
getting on our guard against him? According to this view, perception
would be a response that adjusted the perceiver to the fact perceived,
and made him ready to do something appropriate.

In spite of the attractiveness of this theory of perception, it is
probably not the real essence of the matter. Just as perception may
change while sensation remains the same, so there may be a hesitation
between two motor responses {428} to an object, without any change in
the way it is perceived; and just as a block may occur between
sensation and perception, so also may one occur between perception of
a fact and the motor response. In other words, perception of a fact
may not spell complete readiness to act upon it. The best example of
this is afforded again by cases of localized brain injuries.

It happens, in motor aphasia, that the subject hears and understands a
spoken word--fully perceives it--and yet cannot pronounce it himself.
And at that, there need be no paralysis of the speech organs. The
brain injury has affected the motor speech-cooerdinating machinery, and
deprived the individual of the power to get ready for speaking a word,
even though he perceives it.

Analogous disabilities occur in respect to other movements. It may
happen, through injury somewhere near the motor area, though not
precisely in that area, that one who clearly perceives a seen object
is still quite incapable of handling it. He knows the object, and he
knows in an abstract way what to do with it, but how to go about it he
cannot remember. This type of disturbance is called "motor apraxia",
and, like motor aphasia, it proves that there is a preparation that
follows perception and still precedes actual movement. Paralysis of
the motor area is different; then, the subject both perceives the
object, and gets all ready to act upon it; only, the movement does not
occur.

The truth seems to be that a series of four responses occurs in