ping attack upon the advancing
Germans--a brief survey of the city and fortifications will be
necessary. The situation of the city is not as imposing as that
of Liege. For the most part it sits on a hillside declivity, to
rest in the angle formed by the junction of the Sambre and Meuse.
It is a place of some historic and industrial importance, though
in the latter respect not so well known as Liege. To the west,
however, up the valley of the Sambre, the country presents the
usual features of a mining region--pit shafts, tall chimneys issuing
clouds of black smoke, and huge piles of unsightly debris. While
away to the north stretches the great plain of Central Belgium,
southward the Central Meuse offers a more picturesque prospect in
wooded slopes rising to view-commanding hilltops. Directly east,
the Meuse flows into the precipitous cut on its way to Liege.
But in Belgian eyes the fame of Namur lay to a great extent in its
being the second of Brialmont's fortress masterpieces. Its plan
was that of Liege--a ring of outer detached forts, constructed on
the same armor-clad cupola principle. At Namur these were nine in
number, four major forts and five _fortins_. The distance between
each fort was on the average two and a half miles, with between
two and a half to five miles from the city as the center of the
circumference.
Facing Von Buelow's advance, fort Cognlee protected the Brussels
railway, while the guns of Marchovelette swept the space between
it and the left bank of the Meuse. In the southwest angle formed
by the Meuse, forts Maizeret, Andoy and Dave continued the ring.
Again in the angle of the Sambre and Meuse forts St. Heribert and
Malonne protected the city. North of the Sambre, forts Suarlee
and Emines completed the circle.
In the emergency Namur possessed one advantage over Liege. The
resistance of Liege gave Namur due warning of the German invasion,
and some days to prepare for attack. General Michel was in command
or the garrison of Namur, which comprised from 25,000 to 30,000
men. Doubtless reports had come to him of the situation at Liege.
He immediately set to work to overcome the cause of the failure
of Brialmont's plan at Liege, by constructing trenches between
the forts, protected by barbed wire entanglements, and mines in
advance of the German approach. As his circumference of defense
was less than that of Liege, his force promised to be capable of
a more prolonged resistance.
Besides the
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