dissolved toward the end of the month of August; the
First Army (General Dubail); the Second Army (General de Castelnau);
the Third Army (General Ruffey, replaced at the end of August,
1914, by General Sarrail); the Fourth Army (General de Langle de
Cary); the Fifth Army (General Lanrezac, replaced in the last days
of August, 1914, by General Franche d'Esperey). At the right of this
army was stationed the British army under the command of General
French.
To what resolution did General Joffre, come? On that memorable
evening of the 24th, and on that morning of the 25th, two alternatives
presented themselves before him. Should they, rather than permit
the enemy to invade the soil of France, make a supreme effort to
check the Germans on the frontier?
This first apparent solution had the evident advantage of abandoning
to the enemy no part of the national soil, but it had some serious
inconveniences. The attack of the German armies operating on the
right (Generals von Kluck, von Buelow, von Hausen) were extremely
menacing. In order to parry this attack it was necessary considerably
to reenforce the French left, and for that purpose to transfer from
the right to the left a certain number of army corps. That is what
the military call, in the language of chess players, "to castle" the
army corps. But this movement could not be accomplished in a few
hours. It required, even with all the perfection of organization
shown by the French railways during this war, a certain number of
days. As long as this operation from the right to the left had
not been accomplished, as long as the left wing of the French army
and even the center remained without the reenforcement of elements
taken from the right, it would have been extremely imprudent, not
to say rash, for the French high command to attempt a decisive
battle. If General Joffre had risked a battle immediately he would
have been playing the game without all his trumps in hand and would
have been in danger of a defeat, and even of a decided disaster,
from which it might have been impossible to recover.
The second alternative consisted in drawing back and in profiting
from a retreat by putting everything in shipshape order to bring
about a new grouping of forces. They would allow the Germans to
advance, and when the occasion showed itself favorable the French
armies, along with the British army, would take the offensive and
wage a decisive battle.
It was to this second decis
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