N BATTLE PLANS

So much for the actual disposition of the armies. The question
of preponderance of numbers, of advantages of position, and of
comparative fighting efficiency is the next factor with which to
be reckoned. The numbers were fairly evenly matched. About twelve
days before this fateful day of September 3, 1914, there were
approximately 100 German divisions as against seventy-five French,
British, and Belgian divisions. But, during those twelve days,
French and British mobilization advanced with hectic speed, while,
at the same time, Germany was compelled to transfer ten or perhaps
fifteen of her divisions to the eastern theater of war. It follows,
therefore, that there were about 4,000,000 soldiers in all the
armies that confronted each other in the week of September 3-10,
1914, of whom, probably, 3,000,000 were combatants.

An early estimate placed the German strength at 1,300,000 combatants,
and the Allies at about 1,700,000. A later French estimate put
the Germans at 1,600,000, with the Allies between 1,400,000 and
1,500,000. The preponderance of efficiency of equipment lay with
the Germans.

The plans of the German campaign at this time, so far as they can
be determined from the official orders and from the manner in which
the respective movements were carried out, were three-fold. The
first of these movements was the order given to General von Kluck
to swirl his forces to the southeast of Paris, swerving away from
the capital in an attempt to cut the communications between it and
the Fifth French Army under General d'Esperey. This plan evidently
involved a feint attack upon the Sixth French Army under General
Manoury (though General Pare took charge of the larger issues of
this western campaign), coupled with a swift southerly stroke and
an attack upon what was supposed to be the exposed western flank of
General d'Esperey's army. The cause of the failure of this attempt was
the presence of the British army, as has been shown in the alignment
of the armies given above, and as will be shown in detail later, in
the recital of the actual progress of the fighting. Important as
was this movement, however, it was the least of the three elements
in General von Moltke's plan for the shattering of the great defense
line of the Allies.

The second element in this plan was, contrary to Germany's usual
tactics, the determination to attack the center of the French line
and break through. Almost three-quarters of