along its entire distance.

There were two lines of barbed-wire entanglements, one in the bed
of the stream which would prevent fording or swimming, and which,
being under water, could not easily be destroyed by gunfire from
the southern bank. Above this was a heavy chevaux-de-frise and
barbed-wire entanglement, partly sunk and concealed from view; in
many places pitted and covered with brushwood. Above this, following
approximately a thirty-foot contour, came a line of trenches for
infantry, and fifty yards behind a second line of trenches, commanding
a further elevation of fifty feet. Two-thirds of the way up the
hill came the trench-living quarters, the kitchens, the bakeries,
the dormitories, and so forth, and the crest of the hill bristled
along its entire length with field guns, effectually screened by
trees. On the further side of the ridge, in chalk pits, were the
great howitzers, tossing their huge shells over the ridge and its
defenses into the river itself, and even on the south bank beyond.
Truly, a position of power, and one that the boldest of troops
might hesitate to attack.

It is quite possible that had the entire strength of the German
position been known, no attempt to cross would have been made,
but there was always a possibility that the counterchecks of the
German army were no more than the rear-guard actions of the three
or four days immediately preceding. Yet Sir John French seems to
have expected the true state of affairs, for he remarks in his
dispatches:

"The battles of the Marne, which lasted from the morning of the
6th to the evening of the 10th, had hardly ended in the precipitate
flight of the enemy when we were brought face to face with a position
of extraordinary strength, carefully intrenched and prepared for
defense by an army and staff which are thorough adepts in such
work."

Yet it was evident that if the armies of the Allies were to secure
any lasting benefit from the battles of the Marne, they must dislodge
the invading hosts from their new vantage ground. It was obvious
that the task was one of great peril and one necessarily likely
to be attended with heavy loss of life. Sir John French, knowing
the tactical value of driving a fleeing army hard, determined on
forcing the issue without delay.

Before proceeding to recount in detail the events of that six days'
battle of the Aisne, which little by little solidified into an
impasse, it might be well to trace the new posit