. The stench from the unburied bodies
was so great that officially all the tobacco for the whole battle
front was commandeered and sent to the trenches under the plateau
of Craonne and on the hill to the westward, where the British First
Army Corps was placed. Such, for the two weeks between September
22, 1914, and October 6, 1914, was the trench warfare during the
second phase of the battle of the Aisne, a condition never after
repeated in the war, for such a feat as the crossing of the Aisne
could scarcely be duplicated. It was gallant, it was magnificent,
and it was costly--the British casualty list for September 12 to
October 6, 1914, being, killed, wounded and missing, 561 officers
and 12,980 men--but it was useless, and only served to give the
Allies a temporary base whereby General Foch was successful in
checking the German attempt to capture the Rheims-Verdun railway.
It was a victory of bravery, but not a victory of result.
During all these operations the Belgian army, now at Antwerp, had
harassed the German troops by frequent sorties. The capture of the
city was at once undertaken by the German Staff, following the
stalemate created by the operations at the Aisne.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XXV
"THE RACE TO THE SEA"
The Germans, having failed in their first enveloping movement,
attempted a second after the battle of the Marne. They tried to
repeat their maneuver of August, endeavoring to overwhelm the French
left; while the French, on their side, tried to overwhelm the German
right. Each of these armies, by a converging movement, gradually
drew its forces toward the west. No sooner did the Germans bring
up a new corps on their right than the French brought up another
on their left. Thus the front of the battle ascended more and more
to the west and north until arriving at the sea it could go no
farther. This is what has been called by French military critics
"The Race to the Sea." In this race to the sea the Germans had a
great advantage over the French. A glance at the map is enough
to make it understood. The concave form of the German front made
the lines of transportation shorter; they were within the interior
of the angle, while the French were at the exterior. On the German
side this movement drew into the line more than eighteen army corps,
or twelve active corps, six reserve corps, and four cavalry corps.
On the French side it resulted in the posting of the army of
|