ut all the churches
and castles of France which have shared its fate. These things do
not interest us."

Opinions have naturally differed concerning Von Ditfurth's appraisal
of the comparative values of Rheims Cathedral and the tombstone of
a German grenadier, but even the champions of military necessity
were glad to learn later that the cathedral still stood, though much
damaged. If Rheims were far away from the line of march, and if the
Germans had deliberately gone thither for the purpose of destroying
it--as some prejudiced accounts seem to state--then there would not
be room for two opinions. Wanton vandalism is vandalism largely
in the ratio that it is wanton. But, to be perfectly impartial,
it must be admitted that the second phase of the battle of the
Aisne made the bombardment of Rheims a military necessity. To make
this clear requires a setting forth of the new strategical plan
developed by Field Marshal von Heeringen upon the collapse of the
plan for the drive on Paris, which was foiled by the battles of
the Marne.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXIII

SECOND PHASE OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE

The second phase of the battle of the Aisne contained two factors.
One, the simplest, was the maintenance of that line of defense
against any force that could be brought up against it by the Allies.
It meant the ability to hold strongly fortified positions against all
odds. The history of the trenches that winter, of which more will
be said later, reveals the extent to which the Germans succeeded,
aided by the iron craft of the old Prussian fighter General von
Zwehl.

The other factor depended on the vexed question of means of
communication. There was no cross-country railway linking the eastern
German wing to the western German wing. As has been previously
remarked, all supplies and munitions had to come in a roundabout
way. Verdun was a desired goal, but Field Marshal von Heeringen
was wise enough to know that if the crown prince's effort against
General Sarrail had failed, if the Third French Army had secured
heavy reenforcement, and if it had been left unmolested for a week,
the outer ring of defenses around Verdun would, by that time, have
become so amazingly strengthened that direct or frontal attack
would be impossible, while the flanking attack had failed. It was
vain, therefore, at the present time, to hope that the establishment
of the direct communication between Metz and Verdun mig