than a retreating
army--step by step over northern France without losing them their
morale. The loss of life was fearful, but it never became appalling.
The French soldiers had faith in Joffre, even as their faith in
France, and, while the Germans had victories to cheer them on,
the soldiers of the Allies had to keep up their courage under the
perpetual strain of retreat. The administration had evacuated Paris.
Everywhere it seemed that the weakness of France was becoming apparent.
To the three armies in the field, those commanded severally by
General Manoury, Sir John French, and General Lanrezac, the
generalissimo steadily sent reenforcements. But he informed the
French Government that he was not able to save the capital from a
siege. Yet, as after events showed, while these various conditions
could not rightly be considered as ruses upon General Joffre's
part to lure on the Germans, there is no doubt that he understood
and took full advantage of the readiness of the attacking hosts
to esteem all these points as prophetic of future victory. The
first feature of the French plan, therefore, was to lend color to
the German belief that the armies of the Allies were disheartened
and thereby to induce the attacking forces to join the issue quickly.

The second part of the French plan lay in General Joffre's decision
not to do the expected thing. With General Sarrail placed at the
extremest point of danger, it would have been a likely move to
transfer the entire British Expeditionary Force from the left wing
to the weak point at Bar-le-Duc. There is reason to believe that
General von Kluck believed that this had been done.

The third part of the defensive prepared by General Joffre was that
of a determination to turn the steady retreat into a counterdrive.
Time after time had the other generals implored their leader to
give them leave to take the offensive, and on every occasion a
shake of the head had been the reply. Sir John French had wondered.
But when the French officers found themselves in the region of the
Marne, close to the marshes of St. Gond, where in 1814 Napoleon
had faced the Russians, they were more content. It was familiar
as well as historic ground. Even the youngest officer knew every
foot of that ground thoroughly. It was, at the same time, the best
point for the forward leap and one of the last points at which a
halt could be made.

The fourth part of the plan was the holding fast to the point of
Ve