flicted a sanguinary
defeat on a Saxon army corps in the region of Signy l'Abbaye.

Thanks to these brilliant successes, the retreat was accomplished in
good order and without the French armies being seriously demoralized;
as a matter of fact, they were actually put to flight at no point.
All the French armies were thus found intact and prepared for the
offensive.

The right wing of the German army marched in the direction of Paris
at great speed, and the rapidity of the German onslaught obliged the
French General Staff to prolong the retreat until they were able
to establish a new alignment of forces. The new army established
on the left of the French armies, and intrusted to General Manoury,
was not able to complete its concentration in the localities first
intended. In place of concentrating in the region of Amiens it
was obliged to operate more to the south.

The situation on the evening of September 2, 1914, as a result
of the vigorous onward march of the German right, was as follows:

A corps of German cavalry had crossed the Oise and had reached Chateau
Thierry. The First German Army (General von Kluck), consisting of
four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiegne.
The Second Army (General von Buelow), with three active army corps
and two reserve corps, had attained to the region of Laon. The
Third German Army (General van Hausen), with two active army corps
and a reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne and reached Chateau
Porcin-Attigny.

Farther to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German
Armies, making about twelve active army corps, four reserve corps,
and numerous Ersatz companies, were in contact with the French
troops (Fourth and Fifth Armies) between Vouziers and Verdun, the
others from Verdun to the Vosges. Such was the situation.

It may be seen, if a map is consulted, that the Fifth French Army,
commanded from August 30 by General Franchet d'Esperey, would have
found itself in grave peril following on the backward bending of
the British and French forces operating on its left, if the French
had accepted the challenge of a decisive battle. The French commander
in chief resolutely chose the alternative that obviated such a
risk, that is, he decided on a postponement of the offensive and
the continuation of the retreat.

Already on September 1, 1914, he prescribed as the extreme limits of
the retreat the line running through Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine,
Arcis-sur