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al Joffre published on August 24, 1914, that it was intended to be merely the left wing of a gigantic French battle offensive--on the adopted German plan--from Conde to Belfort. "An army," runs the communique, "advancing from the northern part of the Woevre and moving on Neufchateau is attacking the German forces which have been going through the Duchy of Luxemburg and are on the right bank of the Samoy. Another army from the region of Sedan is traversing the Belgian Ardennes and attacking the German forces marching between the Lesse and the Meuse. A third army from the region of Chimay has attacked the German right between the Sambre and the Meuse. It is supported by the English army from the region of Mons." These attacks comprised chiefly the battle of Dinant and cavalry skirmishing, but the purpose of General Joffre was otherwise made plain in throwing advance French troops across the Belgian frontier into Ligny and Gembloux on the road to a recapture of Brussels. This we have previously noted in another connection. The rout of the French army in Lorraine, however, put an end to the grand Conde-Belfort offensive. Thus the Namur-Conde line became a main defensive position instead of an offensive left wing sweep through Belgium upon Germany. As such it was well enough--if its pivot on the fortress of Namur held secure. Liege had already proved its vulnerability, but it would seem that the French General Staff joined with General Michel, the Commander of Namur, in believing the Namur forts would give a better account. The French General Staff were informed of the approximate strength of the advancing armies of Von Kluck and Von Buelow, and had nothing to fear from inferiority in numbers. The staff never gave out the strength of their forces, but there is reason for believing the great armies were nearly equally matched after mobilization--about 1,200,000 men. Let us now see what was developing in the Ardennes away to the French right. It has been established that woods, particularly in summer, form the best cover from the observation or attacks of airmen. The spreading, leafy boughs are difficult to penetrate visually from a height of even a few hundred feet, at least to obtain accurate information of what is transpiring beneath. French air scouts brought in correct information that they had seen the armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and crown prince massed along the southern Luxemburg and Belgian forest reg
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