ith sufficient frequency to make them well worthy of
consideration, and when such a hand fails to make game, it certainly
seems to be a perfect example of what might be termed "useless
sacrifice."
In spite of all this, however, probably as long as the game lasts, in
the large proportion of hands in which the taking-out does not make any
difference, the Declarer will say, "With such strength you should have
let my No-trump alone"; or the Dummy will learnedly explain, "I was too
strong to take you out."
It would be in the interest of scientific play, if, except when all
suits are stopped, the theory, "Too strong to take the partner out of
the No-trump," had never been conceived, and would never again be
advanced.
The same comment applies with equal force to the remark so often heard,
"Partner, I was too weak to take you out."
This generally emanates from a Third Hand who has a five- or six-card
suit in a trickless hand. He does not stop to realize that his hand
will not aid his partner's No-trump to the extent of a single trick,
but that in a Trump declaration, it will almost certainly take two
tricks. The Trump bid only increases the commitment by one, so it is
obviously a saving and advantageous play. Furthermore, it prevents the
adversaries from running a long suit. It, also, in Clubs and Diamonds,
is a real danger signal, and, in the probable event of a bid by the
Fourth Hand, warns the partner away from two No-trumps.
The advocates of the weakness take-out realize that in exceptional
instances the play may result most unfortunately. When the Dealer has
called a border-line No-trump, without any strength in the suit named
by the Third Hand, and one of the adversaries has great length and
strength in that suit, a heavy loss is bound to ensue, which may be
increased 100 by the advance of the bid from one to two. This case is,
indeed, rare, and when it does turn up the chances are that the
Declarer will escape a double, as the holder of the big Trumps will
fear the Dealer may be able to come to the rescue if he point out the
danger by doubling the suit call.
The fact, however, that a play at times works badly is not a sufficient
argument against its use, if in the majority of cases it prove
advantageous, and that is unquestionably true of the weakness take-out.
The strength take-out, above advocated, applies only to Spades and
Hearts. With Diamonds and Clubs, at a love score, the distance to go
for game i
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