s not so, and therefore
all that lives may after all be uncreated--without a maker. Thus, you
see, the thought of Isvara is overthrown in this discussion; and all
such contradictory assertions should be exposed; if not, the blame is
ours. Again, if it be said self-nature is the maker, this is as faulty
as the first assertion; nor has either of the Hetuvidya sastras asserted
such a thing as this, till now. That which depends on nothing cannot as
a cause make that which is; but all things round us come from a cause,
as the plant comes from the seed; we cannot therefore say that all
things are produced by self-nature. Again, all things which exist spring
not from one nature as a cause; and yet you say self-nature is but one:
it cannot then be cause of all. If you say that that self-nature
pervades and fills all places, if it pervades and fills all things, then
certainly it cannot make them too; for there would be nothing, then, to
make, and therefore this cannot be the cause. If, again, it fills all
places and yet makes all things that exist, then it should throughout
'all time' have made forever that which is. But if you say it made
things thus, then there is nothing to be made 'in time'; know then, for
certain, self-nature cannot be the cause of all. Again, they say that
that self-nature excludes all modifications, therefore all things made
by it ought likewise to be free from modifications. But we see, in fact,
that all things in the world are fettered throughout by modifications;
therefore, again, we say that self-nature cannot be the cause of all.
If, again, you say that that self-nature is different from such
qualities, we answer, since self-nature must have ever caused, it cannot
differ in its nature from itself; but if the world be different from
these qualities, then self-nature cannot be the cause. Again, if
self-nature be unchangeable, so things should also be without decay; if
we regard self-nature as the cause, then cause and consequence of reason
should be one; but because we see decay in all things, we know that they
at least are caused. Again, if self-nature be the cause, why should we
seek to find 'escape'? for we ourselves possess this nature; patient
then should we endure both birth and death. For let us take the case
that one may find 'escape,' self-nature still will reconstruct the evil
of birth. If self-nature in itself be blind, yet 'tis the maker of the
world that sees. On this account, again, it cann