s
resulting from it; what is likely to result from it. Wherefore, in
order that that which is likely to happen may be more conveniently
comprehended in the mind with respect to this genus, we ought first
to consider what is accustomed to result from every separate
circumstance; in this manner:--From arrogance, hatred usually results;
and from insolence, arrogance.
The fourth division is a natural consequence from those qualities,
which we said were usually attributed to things in distinction from
persons. And with respect to this, those circumstances are sought for
which ensue from a thing being done. In the first place, by what name
it is proper that that which has been done should be called. In the
next place, who have been the chief agents in, or originators of that
action; and last of all, who have been the approvers and the imitators
of that precedent and of that discovery. In the next place, whether
there is any regular usage established with regard to that case, or
whether there is any regular rule bearing on that case, or any regular
course of proceeding, any formal decision, any science reduced to
rules, any artificial system. In the next place, whether its nature is
in the habit of being ordinarily displayed, or whether it is so very
rarely, and whether it is quite unaccustomed to be so. After that,
whether men are accustomed to approve of such a case with their
authority, or to be offended at such actions; and with what eyes they
look upon the other circumstances which are in the habit of following
any similar conduct, either immediately or after an interval. And
in the very last place, we must take notice whether any of those
circumstances which are rightly classed under honesty or utility
ensue. But as to these matters it will be necessary to speak more
clearly when we come to mention the deliberative kind of argument.
And the circumstances which we have now mentioned are those which are
usually attributed to things as opposed to persons.
XXIX. But all argumentation, which can be derived from those topics
which we have mentioned, ought to be either probable or unavoidable.
Indeed, to define it in a few words, argumentation appears to be an
invention of some sort, which either shows something or other in a
probable manner, or demonstrates it in an irrefutable one. Those
things are demonstrated irrefutably which can neither be done nor
proved in any other manner whatever than that in which they are
state
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