bring forward any statement of this kind,--"Since she
has had a child, she has lain, with a man," they bring forward a plain
assertion, not a highly worked up argument, but we are speaking of the
parts of a highly worked up argument.
XLI. That principle then has nothing to do with this matter. And with
the help of this distinction we will remove other obstacles which seem
to be in the way of this classification, if any people think that it
is possible that at times the assumption may be omitted, and at other
times the proposition, and if this idea has in it anything probable
or necessary, it is quite inevitable that it must affect the hearer in
some great degree. And if it were the only object in view, and if
it made no difference in what manner that argument which had been
projected was handled, it would be a great mistake to suppose that
there is such a vast difference between the greatest orators and
ordinary ones.
But it will be exceedingly desirable to infuse variety into our
speech, for in all cases sameness is the mother of satiety. That will
be able to be managed if we not always enter upon our argumentation
in a similar manner. For in the first place it is desirable to
distinguish our orations as to their kinds, that is to say, at one
time to employ induction, and at another ratiocination. In the next
place, in the argumentation itself, it is best not always to begin
with the proposition, nor in every case to employ all the five
divisions, nor always to work up the different parts in the same
manner, but it is permissible sometimes to begin with the assumption,
sometimes with one or other of the proofs, sometimes with both,
sometimes to employ one kind of summing up, and sometimes another. And
in order that this variety may be seen, let us either write, or in any
example whatever let us exercise this same principle with respect to
those things which we endeavour to prove, that our task may be as easy
as possible.
And concerning the parts of the argumentation it seems to us that
enough has been said. But we wish to have it understood that we hold
the doctrine that argumentations are handled in philosophy in many
other manners, and those too at times obscure ones, concerning which,
however, there is still some definite system laid down. But still
those methods appear to us to be inconsistent with the practice of an
orator. But as to those things which we think belong to orators, we
do not indeed undertake
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