express
necessity, but they are also adapted to the service of everything, and
their daily and nightly changes have never injured anything in any
particular from being altered capriciously." And all these things are
a token that the nature of the world has been arranged by no ordinary
wisdom. In the fifth division they bring forward that sort of
statement, which either adduces that sort of fact alone which is
compelled in every possible manner, in this way:--"The world,
therefore, is governed on some settled plan;" or else, when it has
briefly united both the proposition and the assumption, it adds this
which is derived from both of them together, in this way:--"But if
those things are managed better which are conducted on a settled plan,
than those which are conducted without such settled plan; and if
nothing whatever is managed better than the entire world; therefore it
follows that the world is managed on a settled plan." And in this way
they think that such argumentation has five divisions.

XXXV. But those who affirm that it has only three divisions, do not
think that the argumentation ought to be conducted in any other way,
but they find fault with this arrangement of the divisions. For they
say that neither the proposition nor the assumption ought to be
separated from their proofs; and that a proposition does not appear to
be complete, nor an assumption perfect, which is not corroborated by
proof. Therefore, they say that what those other men divide into two
parts, proposition and proof, appears to them one part only, namely
proposition. For if it be not proved, the proposition has no business
to make part of the argumentation. In the same way they say that
that which those other men call the assumption, and the proof of the
assumption, appears to them to be assumption only. And the result is,
that the whole argumentation being treated in the same way, appears to
some susceptible of five divisions, and to others of only three; so
that the difference does not so much affect the practice of speaking,
as the principles on which the rules are to be laid down.

But to us that arrangement appears to be more convenient which divides
it under five heads; and that is the one which all those who come from
the school of Aristotle, or of Theophrastus, have chiefly followed.
For as it is chiefly Socrates and the disciples of Socrates who have
employed that former sort of argumentation which goes on induction,
so this which