out, then the prohibition of the
Constitution could not have altered the fact. In the case of murder
the man is killed, and murder is thus committed in spite of the law.
The fact of killing is essential to the committal of the crime, and
the fact of going out is essential to secession. But in this case
there was no such fact. I think I need not argue any further the
position that the rebel States have never for one moment, by any
ordinances of secession, or by any successful war, carried themselves
beyond the rightful jurisdiction of the Constitution of the United
States. They have interrupted for a time the practical enforcement and
exercise of that jurisdiction; they rendered it impossible for a time
for this Government to enforce obedience to its laws; but there has
never been an hour when this Government, or this Congress, or this
House, or the gentleman from Pennsylvania himself, ever conceded that
those States were beyond the jurisdiction of the Constitution and laws
of the United States."

Referring to the citation of authorities made by Mr. Stevens, Mr.
Raymond maintained that they did not lend the "slightest countenance
to the inference which was drawn from them."

In reply to the theory maintained by Mr. Stevens, that States
forfeited their State existence by the fact of rebellion, Mr. Raymond
said: "I do not see how there can be any such forfeiture involved or
implied. The individual citizens of those States went into the
rebellion. They thereby incurred certain penalties under the laws and
Constitution of the United States. What the States did was to endeavor
to interpose their State authority between the individuals in
rebellion and the Government of the United States, which assumed, and
which would carry out the assumption, to declare those individuals
traitors for their acts. The individuals in the States who were in
rebellion, it seems to me, were the only parties who, under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, could incur the penalties
of treason. I know of no law, I know of nothing in the Constitution of
the United States, I know of nothing in any recognized or established
code of international law, which can punish a State as a State for any
act it may perform. It is certain that our Constitution assumes
nothing of the kind. It does not deal with States, except in one or
two instances, such as elections of members of Congress and the
election of electors of President and Vice-President.